Ajahn Thanissaro’s letter on bhikkhunis

Thanks to those who posted the link to the collected set of essays responding to Ajahn Thanissaro’s letter, which attempted to find a Vinaya basis for refuting the recent bhikkhuni ordination. The responses are all good, and I agree with them completely.

One of the lovely things that emerges from this conflict has been the realization that there are many good people who understand the value of the Dhamma and Vinaya, and who have such a determined, intelligent, compassionate approach to implementing that in our complex times. It is particularly nice to see the bhikkhunis themselves stepping up and having their say. It is, after all, their lives.

I would like to just add a couple of small remarks here, which essentially make the same point from a slightly different angle. Some time ago I made a post on the Quarrel at Kosambi, where the Buddha gives ’18 points’ which should be used to evaluate the competing claims by parties at a disputation. Since this is explicitly the guide that Buddha says we should use in such cases, let’s have a quick look at Ajahn Thanissaro’s argument in the light of the 18 points. For easy reference, here are the 18 points again:

A teacher of non-Dhamma is one who:

teaches non-Dhamma as Dhamma and vice versa;
teaches non-Vinaya as Vinaya and vice versa;
teaches what was not spoken by the Buddha as being spoken by the Buddha, and vice versa;
teaches what was not practiced by the Buddha as being practiced by the Buddha, and vice versa;
teaches what was not laid down as a Vinaya rule by the Buddha as if it were laid down by the Buddha, and vice versa;
teaches what is no offence as an offence, and vice versa;
teaches a slight offence as a serious offence, and vice versa;
teaches a resolvable offence as unresolvable, and vice versa;
teaches a corrupt offence as not corrupt, and vice versa.

A teacher of Dhamma teaches the opposite of all these.

Let’s take these in groups.

[One] teaches non-Dhamma as Dhamma and vice versa;
teaches non-Vinaya as Vinaya and vice versa;

In this case, the Vinaya is clear enough: ordaining more than one bhikkhuni every two years is an offence requiring confession. This is the understanding that the ordination proceeded under, and all those who took part agreed that this minor rule, laid down in the context of an accommodation crisis, should not obstruct the establishment of the bhikkhuni Sangha. This is Dhamma and Vinaya in a very simple and straightforward sense. Ajahn Thanissaro’s argument, on the other hand, is based on principles that are not found anywhere in the Vinaya, but are the result of a complicated and, in my opinion, implausible chain of reasoning.

Ajahn Thanissaro argues that since the ordination resulted in the infraction of a minor rule, it is ‘not Vinaya’. But Vinaya is not a system of absolute black and whites, with immediate invalidation of anything that transgresses a minor rule. On the contrary, Vinaya, as laid down in the texts, is a highly flexible instrument, which clearly tries to be as reasonable and contextual as possible. If one acknowledges a minor fault and confesses it, that is Vinaya.

[One] teaches what was not spoken by the Buddha as being spoken by the Buddha, and vice versa;
teaches what was not practiced by the Buddha as being practiced by the Buddha, and vice versa;
teaches what was not laid down as a Vinaya rule by the Buddha as if it were laid down by the Buddha, and vice versa;

In this case the actions of the ordaining Sangha were based directly on the Pali text as it has come down. In this case, it is probably as close to the Buddha’s words as we are likely to find. Ajahn Thanissaro’s reasoning, on the other hand, is based on commentaries and the late Parivara, which are certainly not the Buddha’s words.

He also relies on a reading of a particular passage in the Mahavagga, which says that if a sanghakamma is done ‘apart from Dhamma, Vinaya, and the Buddha’s teaching’, it is ‘not a kamma’ and ‘should not be done’. Ajahn Thanissaro argues that since the ordination procedure itself involved the infraction of a Vinaya rule, it is ‘apart from Vinaya’ and hence is ‘not a kamma’.

The relevant passage (for which he gives the mistaken reference M 10.3.2 – it should be M 9.3.2) occurs in the Campeyyakkhandhaka. It is part of a highly legalistic series of permutations of applications of how to determine the validity of an act. The style is very Abhidhammic, and there is only the most casual of attempts to attribute the passage to the Buddha himself. No-one reading this could imagine it was literally spoken by the same Buddha who invited the Sangha to relinquish the ‘lesser and minor rules’. The permutation series is established on the entirely conventional assumption that the ‘group of six monks’ (a Vinaya trope for ‘the bad boys’) had performed a series of invalid sanghakammas. As usual, they were not content to do just one or two, but systematically worked through every kind of flawed procedure, being criticized at each turn. The context, and other appearances of the group of six, makes it very clear that these were monks without conscience or scruple, who disregarded every principle of the Dhamma in their pursuit of their own selfish interests. When the texts say they performed acts ‘apart from Vinaya, apart from Dhamma, apart from the Buddha’s teaching’, that is exactly what it means: they were outlaws, operating with no regard for the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha. This passage has nothing to do with the careful and scrupulous manner in which the Perth bhikkhuni ordinations were performed.

[One] teaches what is no offence as an offence, and vice versa;
teaches a slight offence as a serious offence, and vice versa;
teaches a resolvable offence as unresolvable, and vice versa;
teaches a corrupt offence as not corrupt, and vice versa.

The most important point to notice here is proportionality: while Vinaya inevitably involves a degree of formality and conventions, this is clearly recognized as such. The Vinaya is well aware of the difference between minor infractions of procedure, and things that will destroy the holy life. In this case, there is no question that the pācittiya offence is a minor one. The Pali Vinaya itself calls pācittiyas ‘minor’ (khuddaka). Yet this is now used, not merely to invalidate the ordination of the Dhammasara bhikkhunis – an act that has already caused harm and stress. It would invalidate the majority, if not all, of the bhikkhuni ordinations that have been performed in Sri Lanka, and perhaps the world. At a stroke, based on an obscure chain of reasoning derived from a minor rule, the female Sangha is wiped out. This is so disproportional that it beggars the imagination.

If i may be permitted to bring in a comparison with secular law, imagine a case where someone had just received Australian citizenship. For its own inscrutable reasons, the Government decides it doesn’t want this person to be a citizen, so it hires a hotshot lawyer to make the case. The lawyer investigates, and the only thing he can come up with is this. The citizenship procedure requires that the candidate sings the national anthem, Advance Australia Fair. Yet, out of compassion, the custom had become for them to sing just three verses, not the whole thing. The lawyer argues that, while the law does not actually stipulate that the whole song must be sung, that much is implied in simply stating that it should be sung. The citizenship procedure itself states that the new citizen is to uphold the laws of Australia, yet she is breaking the law in the very act of taking the oath! While this might seem like a legalistic maneuver, our lawyer goes on, in fact the Australian nation is based on the rule of law, and compliance with this rule of law is demonstrated in respect for even minor procedures. There are certain other cases, he goes on, where a citizenship ceremony is indeed invalid if improper procedure is followed – for example, if a person does not state their name in the citizenship ceremony. If such cases are disallowed, then surely any other infraction should be disallowed. In adhering to the strict interpretation of the law here, we are acting out of compassion for the citizens of Australia, in making sure that only law abiding people become Australians. As a result of this finding, this person must be expelled from Australia; and, incidentally, thousands of others will also be expelled. They will become Stateless, their families broken, their careers destroyed. But the integrity of the nation of Australia will be preserved.

Is this an accurate comparison? You can let me know what you think.

In any case, as so many have put it so much better than I can, our mission and our goal here is to develop the good qualities of the heart, to embody the Dhamma of love and forgiveness. The essential problem here is not Vinaya legalities, but the injustice of excluding women from full participation in the holy life. Until we acknowledge this central fact, any legal argument will miss the point. The Vinaya is intended to support and encourage human beings to find liberation from suffering. The Vinaya rule that Ajahn Thanissaro quotes was intended to curb the bad behavior of unscrupulous monks, not to stop human beings from practicing Dhamma because they have different reproductive organs.

May the Sangha lift its head and open its heart! May the Sangha find room for all good people who seek liberation!